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Research · The Lag Index

The Lag Index

The productivity lag as a single number. AI is deployed almost everywhere and visible almost nowhere in the output statistics — Solow's old paradox, returned. The Lag Index tracks how far the payoff has actually arrived, because the answer decides whether the build-out's financing outlasts its wait.

5
Lag Index · 0–100

Deep in the trough. Inputs are nearly fully deployed; payoff has barely begun to register. The index is the share of the technology's productivity potential that has actually shown up in the aggregate statistics — and it is still in the single digits.

Inputs deployed
78%
Payoff realized
~5%
The lag (gap)
73pp

Lag Index = realized AI-attributable productivity as a share of full-diffusion potential. Inputs = enterprise adoption. Payoff = AI-attributable TFP (~0.07pp/yr) against a full-GPT-payoff benchmark (~1.5pp/yr, the late-1990s IT surge). Illustrative calibration; see sources.

~78%
Enterprise adoption
AI deployed somewhere
~90%
Report zero impact
on output in 3 yrs
+0.07pp
AI-attributable TFP
/yr · vs +40% self-reported
≥3 yr
Min. implementation delay
adoption → measured output

The shape · adoption vs payoff

Deployed everywhere, visible nowhere — yet

Plot the two curves on one scale — each as a share of full potential — and the lag is the white space between them. Adoption has raced to roughly 78%. Realized payoff has crawled to about 5%. Every prior general-purpose technology opened a gap like this; the question is only how long it stays open. Economist Torsten Slok frames the fork bluntly: the J-curve payoff could arrive in 2027 — or 2037.

Adoption and realized payoff as % of full-diffusion potential, 2018–2030. Solid = observed; dashed = the two scenarios from the trough. The shaded band is the lag. Adoption: enterprise surveys. Payoff: AI-attributable TFP vs the IT-surge benchmark. Projections are scenarios, not forecasts.

Calibration · the historical lags

Every engine waited

Electricity
~30 years

A three-decade productivity pause while factories redesigned around the motor — then manufacturing TFP ran +5%/yr through the 1920s.

IT / computers
~10 years

Solow's 1987 paradox — "computers everywhere except the statistics" — gave way to the 1995–2004 productivity surge.

AI
Year ~3

Adoption faster than either predecessor; payoff not yet in the data. Whether the lag is IT-short or electricity-long is the whole question.

Why the index matters: this is one of the two clocks we time. The Lag Index measures when the payoff arrives. Stranded Compute and Capex Watch measure how long the financing lasts. The fragility case is simply this: a lag that runs electricity-long against financing built for an IT-short wait. The bull case is the mirror — payoff by 2027, before the capex reprices.

Research discipline · what would move the index

The falsifiers

The index is built to move with the evidence. It climbs — and the bull case strengthens — if:

We track these on Capex Watch; when the official statistics move, the index moves with them.

Method & sources

The Lag Index is an illustrative calibration of published figures, not a proprietary econometric model; it expresses realized AI-attributable productivity as a share of full-diffusion potential. Figures are current as of mid-2026 and will move.

Adoption, "zero impact," and exec-usage figures: CEO survey via Fortune. AI-attributable TFP & the micro-macro gap: Kansas City Fed, BLS. The J-curve & "2027 or 2037": Torsten Slok / Apollo via industry reporting. Historical GPT lags (electricity, IT): general-purpose-technology literature (David; Brynjolfsson et al.). Cross-referenced with our own Capex Watch.

Not investment advice. Divergent Compute is a research institution; nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell any security.